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 The Development of Irrigation in
 Provence, 1 700-1860: The French
 Revolution and Economic Growth
 JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL
 Quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the returns to irrigation in
 France were similar during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Old
 Regime failed to develop irrigation because of fragmented political authority over
 rights of eminent domain. Since many groups could hold projects up, transaction
 costs increased dramatically. Reforms enacted during the French Revolution
 reduced the costs of securing rights of eminent domain.
 Historians and economic historians hotly debate the issue of the
 French Revolution's contribution to economic growth. Most view
 the French Revolution either as testimony to the Old Regime's inability
 to survive in the world created by the Industrial Revolution, or as the
 unfortunate result of poor political calculations on the part of the
 nobility or the king's ministers.' Hence scholars have focused on the
 causes of the Revolution. As Alfred Cobban argues, however, the true
 measure of such an event probably lies in its consequences.2 Although
 economic historians have tended to point to technological change as the
 crucial source of economic growth, more and more attention is being
 paid to the development of markets and to the relationship between
 institutional change and economic growth.3 One important area where it
 has been argued that institutions held back development in Old Regime
 France is agriculture. This article attempts to assess the impact of the
 Revolution of 1789 on a specific agricultural investment-irrigation in
 southeastern France. I show that both quantitative and qualitative
 evidence suggest that irrigation was profitable under the Old Regime. To
 The Journal of Economic History, Vol. L, No. 3 (Sept. 1990). ? The Economic History
 Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
 The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024.
 This article is a revised version of the fourth chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Fruits of
 Revolution: Property Rights, Litigation and French Agriculture (1700-1860)" (Caltech, 1988). I
 would like to thank Philip Hoffman and Lance Davis for their guidance, as well as Ken Sokoloff and
 two referees and the editors for very helpful suggestions. The archival research was made possible
 by two travel grants from the California Institute of Technology and by the John Randolph and
 Dora Haines Fellowship.
 ' See, for example, Donald Sutherland, France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution
 (Oxford, 1985); and Michel Vovelle, La Chute de la monarchie, 1787-1872 (Paris, 1972).
 2 Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1968), p. 67.
 3 See Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York, 1985); see also
 Philip Hoffman, "Institutions and Agriculture in Old-Regime France," Politics and Society, 16
 (June-Sept. 1988), pp. 241-64.
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 616 Rosenthal
 explain the lack of growth in irrigation before 1789, I explore legal
 constraints and argue that divided authority over rights of way was the
 most important factor responsible for hindering agricultural growth.
 The narrowness of the topic-irrigation in Provence-is dictated by
 the need for precise knowledge of institutions and their historical
 context. Since law and the distribution of political power varied greatly
 across regions in Old Regime France, a national approach to institu-
 tional problems would miss details that might explain the diversity of
 regional performance and failure. My conclusions, however, should
 hold for most of eighteenth-century France, because any investment
 project that featured externalities would have been plagued by the same
 problems that plagued irrigation.
 IRRIGATION AND PROVENCAL AGRICULTURE
 Considered from a geographic point of view, Provence, one of
 France's more arid regions, was an area where development of an
 irrigation network should have had the greatest impact before 1789.4
 Years when rainfall is negligible from June to October are frequent,
 restricting agricultural production to grains, grapes, and olives on dry
 fields. The obvious remedy to the arid climate was, and remains,
 irrigation. Until the twentieth century the main source of irrigation
 water was the Durance River, a tributary to the Rhone.
 Because the water of the Durance is very silty, it acts as a natural
 fertilizer, which permitted eighteenth-century farmers to avoid the
 biennial fallow on irrigated plots. The abandonment of the fallow alone
 indicates how dramatic an impact irrigation could have on total output.
 Yet the value of output would have probably more than doubled
 because irrigation also allowed farmers to abandon traditional crops in
 favor of fodder grasses, peas, beans, and other high-value crops. These
 more valuable crops require both the warmth of the summer and
 significant amounts of water. Thus irrigation could lead to substantial
 per-acre increases in output.
 A more accurate measure of the increase in efficiency associated with
 irrigation involves estimating the rise in total factor productivity, a
 measure of productivity change that takes into account the fact that more
 labor and, capital were applied to irrigated than to dry land. Using
 sharecropping contracts to trace changes in the quantity of labor and
 capital applied to the land, I estimate that total factor productivity per acre
 4 Throughout the article Provence will denote the present-day departements of the Vaucluse
 and the Bouches du Rh6ne. While these departments represent only lower Provence, the rest of
 southeastern France, namely, the C6te d'Azur and upper Provence, has a much lower potential for
 irrigation development.
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 Irrigation in Provence 617
 would have risen at least 30 to 40 percent as a result of irrigation.' Thus
 irrigation would have represented a significant increase in efficiency.
 Unlike farmers or landowners, Old Regime royal governments may
 have been less concerned with increasing production on specific plots of
 land than with raising regional agricultural output. Using data from the
 1870s I compute a conservative estimate of the change in total factor
 productivity as a result of the development of irrigation after 1789 (see
 the Appendix for details). Had the canals planned or proposed under the
 Old Regime, but only realized after 1789, been built in the eighteenth
 century, the increase in total output in the region would have been more
 than 7 percent.6 While an output increase of 7 percent at the regional
 level may seem small, it would have significantly eased any short-term
 Malthusian constraints on the population, the very problem that con-
 cerned so many government officials.7 A qualitative survey of the
 geography and economy of eighteenth-century Provence thus suggests
 that irrigation should have seen greater development under the Old
 Regime. The benefits of irrigation were well known long before 1820,
 when the development of irrigation began in earnest. Indeed, some of
 the canals of southeastern France dated back to the Middle Ages.8
 Many irrigation projects were proposed between 1700 and 1789, so we
 must look to something other than ignorance to explain why irrigation
 grew so slowly before 1789.
 PROFITABILITY
 Improvements in technology, credit markets, or relative price
 changes are all potential causes for the sudden development of irrigation
 canals after 1820. Using data from projects built between 1760 and 1860,
 we shall see that neither profits nor techniques, nor even credit was the
 determining factor in the timing of irrigation development.
 Let us first assume that there was little technical change and that
 credit was easily available and present the data collected to examine the
 issue of profits.9 Too few canals were built between 1700 and 1860 to
 measure directly the profitability of irrigation projects. Moreover no
 5 Abandoning the fallow leads, over two years, to twice the output on the same piece of land but
 at the cost of more labor and capital. Farmers probably invested some labor and capital on the
 fallow, so irrigation would not double labor and capital inputs. Because I want to compute a lower
 bound for total factor productivity growth, I assume that labor and capital inputs double. The
 assumption that nonland inputs double is consistent with estimated labor and capital inputs from
 rental contracts.
 6 Provence was a net importer of grain throughout the eighteenth century. Thus the increased
 output could have been either consumed locally or used to purchase more food.
 ' Not surprisingly, Old Regime government officials promoted irrigation, but royal government
 protection proved insufficient to overcome institutional obstacles.
 8 The canals of Saint-Julien in Cavaillon and l'H6pital in Avignon were built between 1200 and
 1350.
 9 I defend these assumptions in the section titled "Technology and Credit."
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 irrigation projects were realized until 1765 in Provence. It is possible,
 however, to estimate the level of profits that projects would have earned
 had they been started earlier than 1765. Estimating rates of return
 requires three kinds of data: price series for the inputs and outputs of
 canal construction; factor shares for each canal; and an interest rate
 series (because the costs and benefits are spread over time).
 Unfortunately, canal accounts are not very detailed. Except in the
 case of skilled and unskilled labor, it is difficult to get factor shares for
 such things as quarried stone, lime, wood, and other material inputs.
 However, since nonlabor inputs were mostly used on bridges and in a
 few buildings, land and labor comprised nearly all the costs of canal
 construction. The measure of costs for a canal includes building costs
 and maintenance costs. For the jth construction year expenditures are
 divided between man-days spent digging using unskilled labor (di),
 man-days of construction, which requires skilled labor (di), and the
 amount of land consumed by the canal (n). Man-days of labor and acres
 of land are bought at market prices w', w', and pi (all land bought for the
 canal is assumed irrigated, which biases the rates of return downward).
 The present value of future maintenance costs is the yearly maintenance
 cost (m) divided by the interest rate r'.
 The social return to building a canal is taken to be the increase in the
 price of land when it becomes irrigated (pi - pd). Since land is the only
 input in fixed supply, in the long run the net increase in output from
 irrigation should accrue to the owner of the land. Thus if N acres of land
 become irrigated, the social return will be N times (pi - pd). Given these
 assumptions one can compute the hypothetical benefit-cost ratio, R',
 had the project started in year t and taken T years to complete:'0
 N( Pi-PdtW1 + r (1T
 Rt=
 E(diuwt + disws + npit)1(1 + r t) i+ (+rt)
 To estimate hypothetical profits, I was able to construct two different
 wage series, using data from Avignon, a large town in the middle of the
 area." The data consist of wage bills for unfed labor from the account
 0 The hypothetical internal rate of return is simply the r'* that sets R' equal to 1.
 II For any year wages are nearly identical across sources in the area. Avignon, the major city,
 has the most abundant sources, and the ones which were used to construct the series. The
 noticeable intraregional pattern was that unskilled labor was somewhat cheaper in nearby villages
 but skilled labor was more expensive there than in Avignon. There was considerable seasonal
 fluctuation in wages, partially due to variation in the working day. For further detail, see the
 Appendix.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 20:10:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Irrigation in Provence 619
 books of religious and municipal organizations. 12 Religious institutions
 owned medieval canals and they hired labor by the day for maintenance
 work. Thus the wage data come from the very professions involved in
 canal construction and maintenance. These data have been sorted into
 two series: skilled and unskilled workers (see Table 4). The first,
 unskilled labor, was constructed from the wages of laborers, road
 gangs, and levee maintenance workers. The second was constructed
 from skilled workers' wages (masons, miners, carpenters, gang bosses,
 and so on).'3
 The data for the land price series are taken from a sample of land-sale
 and land-lease contracts negotiated between 1700 and 1855 that were
 found among the archives of notaires in Cavaillon, the town with the
 largest amount of irrigated land in southeastern France both in the
 eighteenth and in the nineteenth century.'4 The choice of Cavaillon
 allows us to ignore any local market effects on the price of improved
 land. If anything, the fact that Cavaillon had more irrigated land than
 other areas should bias the price of irrigated land downward and thus
 underestimate potential canal revenues.15
 Calculating hypothetical profits also requires data on the costs and
 revenues of canals built between 1700 and 1860. Data are available for
 two eighteenth-century projects, Cabedan-Neuf and Crillon, and for
 two projects proposed in the eighteenth century but not realized until
 the nineteenth, Plan-Oriental and Carpentras. While there are insuffi-
 cient data to estimate the profits of other projects, my sample of canals
 is representative of most canals built between 1700 and 1860, in terms of
 size, location, and timing. The canal of Carpentras is as large as any in
 Provence and the smaller ones of Cabedan-Neuf, Crillon, and Plan-
 12 Most of the workers who received food were paid not on a per-diem basis, but on a monthly
 or yearly basis. Not knowing how many days of work corresponded to a year's wages, I did not use
 wage bills of workers who received food as part of their compensation.
 13 The data also reflect some of the extraordinary levels of inflation associated with the French
 Revolution, unlike most series previously published. One excellent source for wage data is Ren6
 Baehrel, Une Croissance: La Basse Provence rurale (1650-1789) (Paris, 1962). Unfortunately
 Baehrel's data stop in 1789. The sources used for wages came from the Archives Departementales
 in Avignon. The sources include the accounts books of the city of Avignon (AC Avignon, CC 550
 to CC 805, pieces a l'appui des Comptes), religious institutions (AD Vaucluse, H Bompas 182-185;
 H Cordeliers Avignon, 62-64), and the hospital of Avignon (AD Vaucluse, H sup. H6pital Ste
 Marthe E 103, M 6-18).
 14 Cavaillon is a local market town located 17 miles to the east of Avignon, 30 miles northwest
 of Aix, on the banks of the Durance River.
 15 In Old Regime France transportation costs were high. If only a small portion of a given area
 was irrigated, such land would fetch a very high price. When the irrigation network was completed
 the price would fall dramatically; thus we want to use a price for irrigated land that is close to the
 price irrigated land would have fetched after the network was completed and a price for dry land
 that is the price of irrigable dry land. By 1700, 15 percent of the area of Cavaillon was irrigated. The
 large area irrigated suggests that most irrigation-specific goods would have commanded only a
 competitive price. Moreover, most of Cavaillon's nonirrigated land under cultivation was irrigable,
 so we are in fact measuring the price difference between irrigable and irrigated land with reasonable
 confidence.
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 Oriental are similar in size to most other projects. 16 Table 1 displays in
 condensed form all the project-specific data used in the construction of
 hypothetical profit streams.
 The only other data necessary are interest rates. These are taken for
 the eighteenth century from rentes data collected in Provence that have
 been sorted into decadal averages, and in the nineteenth century from
 French government bond data. 17
 I estimated both benefit-cost ratios and internal rates of return.18 All
 projects were profitable during nearly the entire period under study. But
 the projects were more profitable before 1750, when they were not
 carried out, than after 1820, when they were. Although some projects
 are always more profitable than others, changes in profit rates are
 similar for all projects. In addition, the profitability of an irrigation canal
 does not seem to depend on the scale of the project. Profits for any
 project vary significantly from one estimate to the next, but the
 benefit-cost ratios are less than 1.2 in fewer than 20 percent of the years.
 The estimates suggest that any uncertainty about the profits of a canal
 concerned their magnitude rather than their existence. The dispersion of
 rates of return and benefit-cost ratios is largely due to variations in the
 increase in the value of land as a result of irrigation (75 percent of the
 variance of the benefit-cost ratios is explained by a regression of the
 ratio on land prices). Because the hypothetical profits of Old Regime
 projects are similar to the hypothetical profits realized by projects built
 after 1820, it is unlikely that changes in technology played a major role
 in irrigation development. Had there been a lot of technological change,
 later projects should have been much more profitable.
 As Table 2 suggests, the highest profits came in the early eighteenth
 century between 1700 and 1730. During the years 1735 to 1755 projects
 were less profitable-though not unprofitable-than at any other time
 except for the Revolutionary period. A number of projects built after
 16 Cabedan-Neuf irrigated 600 hectares in and around Cavaillon and was built from 1764 to 1766;
 Crillon irrigated 1,000 hectares around Avignon and was completed in 1777. Plan-Oriental, another
 canal in Cavaillon, watered 800 hectares to the north of Cavaillon; it was built in 1823. Carpentras
 was very large; built in the 1850s, it irrigated more than 4,500 hectares.
 17 The interest rate data for the eighteenth century comes from J.-L. Rosenthal, "Credit Markets
 in Southeastern France, 1650-1788" (UCLA Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 589). For the
 nineteenth century I have relied on Stanley Homer, A History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick,
 1977), pp. 156-57, 172, 195-96, 222-23. I preferred to ignore the interest data in David Weir and
 Frangois Velde, "The Financial Market and Government Debt in France, 1750-1793" (Paper
 presented at the Second International Cliometrics meeting, Santander, 1989). The data they present
 come from government interest rates that are significantly affected by the government probability
 of default. As a consistency check I did estimate benefit-cost ratios using these data with results
 similar to those from using the rentes data. In fact, none of the results depend strongly on the
 choice of an interest rate, provided it is less than 8 percent. An interest rate of 8 percent is higher
 than any paid in the eighteenth century by the French government (except in 1770) or by private
 borrowers.
 18 The data and results are presented in detail in the Appendix.
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 TABLE 1
 CANAL COSTS
 Total Capitalized
 Land Building Maintenance
 Date of Irrigated Costs Costs
 Canal Completion (in hectares) (in francs)
 Cabedan-Neuf 1 1767 500 822,300c 97,200
 Cabedan-Neuf Ilb 1767 270 172,490 97,200
 Crillon 1779 1,000 400,000 400,000
 Plan-Oriental 1821 590 138,595 100,000
 Carpentras 1857 5,000 5,297,011 100,000
 Years Under Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Land Requirements
 Canal Construction (in man-days per year) (in hectares)
 Cabedan-Neuf I 2 88,815 73,053 27.0
 Cabedan-Neuf II 2 21,410 19,824 27.0
 Crillon 3 35,088 41,190 49.5
 Plan-Oriental 2 63,561 46,631 9.7
 Carpentrasd 6
 First 3 Years 61,341 224,242 96.7
 Last 3 Years 221,852 112,403 73.3
 a One hectare equals 2.4 acres.
 b Cabedan-Neuf I and Cabedan-Neuf II are the same canal, but the various sources on construction
 accounts could not be reconciled. Not knowing which one was more accurate I present results
 based on both sets of sources.
 c All costs are given for the year in which they were incurred. There was no need to deflate them
 because they are converted into quantities of labor.
 d Carpentras was a very large canal. For the first three years work focused on the main canal. Only
 in the next three years were branches built. See Rend Caillet, Le Canal de Carpentras (Carpentras,
 1925), vol. 1, pp. 69-70.
 Sources: For the first estimate of the costs of Cabedan-Neuf: Jean-Auguste Barral, Les Irrigations
 dans le Vaucluse (Paris, 1876), pp. 539-44. For the second estimate of the costs of Cabedan-Neuf:
 Syndicat du Canal de Cabedan-Neuf, Archives et Documents 1230-1883 (Cavaillon, 1883), pp.
 45-52. For the canal of Crillon: A. Reboulet, "Le Canal de Crillon," in Me'moires de I'Acadc6mie
 de Vaucluse (33, 1914), pp. 37-40; and Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse, pp. 326-27. For
 Plan-Oriental: Andrd Martel, "Les Origines du Canal de Plan-Oriental," in Actes du Congres des
 Societes Savantes (Avignon, 1955), pp. 394-95; and Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse, pp.
 545-47. For Carpentras: Rend Caillet, Le Canal de Carpentras (Carpentras, 1925), vol. 2, pp.
 199-201; and Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse, pp. 325-26.
 1760 were proposed during this intermediate period, suggesting that
 investors, at least, found it profitable to attempt irrigation development.
 The last decades of the Old Regime between 1760 and 1785 show high
 internal rates of return and high benefit-cost ratios. The rates of the late
 eighteenth century, were in fact higher on average than those of the
 nineteenth century when most of the development actually took place.
 After 1785 the rates of return were highly erratic until 1820, no doubt
 because of the uncertainties provoked by the Revolution.
 The high levels of estimated profits through most of the Old Regime,
 and in particular during the years from 1700 to 1730, suggest that
 changes in relative prices were not responsible for the late development
 of irrigation in southeastern France. During most of the eighteenth
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 TABLE 2
 AVERAGE HYPOTHETICAL INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN
 (in percent per year)
 Periods
 Canal 1700-1730 1735-1755 1760-1785 1790-1820 1820-1855
 Cabedan-Neuf 1 (1767) 113.0 32.5 77.8 11.0 63.3
 Cabedan-Neuf II (1767) 60.0 2.1 35.3 -16.0 24.2
 Crillon (1779) 91.8 33.8 68.6 10.7 57.8
 Plan-Oriental (1821) 126.9 49.9 104.0 25.3 78.9
 Carpentras (1857) 32.0 13.4 30.0 -1.4 25.0
 Interest Rate 5.0 5.1 5.0 7.5 4.3
 Sources: Table 6.
 century rates of return were in fact higher than they were in the
 nineteenth century. Yet irrigation development was much more limited
 from 1700 to 1789 than it was from 1820 to 1860. Indeed, despite the fact
 that hypothetical rates of return before 1760 were well above the interest
 rate, no canal was built before that date. Thus some sort of a market
 failure in the supply of irrigation must have been at work in the
 eighteenth century.
 TECHNOLOGY AND CREDIT
 Given the high levels of hypothetical profits, it is important to
 examine the validity of assumptions made about technology and credit
 availability. The design of French transportation canals was very
 sophisticated; these canals involved locks, dams, bridges, and complex
 water management.'9 The technology of transportation canals was also
 greatly improved between 1700 and 1855. By contrast, the technology of
 irrigation seems to have remained the same from the Middle Ages to the
 late nineteenth century. The methods used between 1700 and 1860
 resembled those used in the thirteenth century in building the canals of
 Saint-Julien and l'Hopital, or in the sixteenth century in building the
 canal of Craponne.20 From 1200 to 1870 all new irrigation canals were
 unlined dirt ditches, where water flowed by gravity alone. Stone
 masonry was used only for bridges. The only dams in use, flimsy dirt
 levees that captured the water from the Durance River, had to be rebuilt
 after every large flood. They diverted part of the river's flow but made
 no attempt to retain water in a reservoir.
 Agricultural development simply could not support the innovative,
 " A valuable source on eighteenth-century canal technology is Delalande, Des Canaux de
 navigation (Paris, 1777). See also Andre Maistre, Le Canal des deux mers: Canal royal du
 Languedoc, 1666-1810 (Toulouse, 1968), chap. 3.
 20 Jean Rigaud, Le Canal de Craponne, Etude historique et juridique relative aux concessions
 complexes des arrosages communaux d'Istre et Grans (Aix-en-Provence, 1934); Roger Caillet, Le
 Canal de Carpentras (Carpentras, 1925), chaps. 2, 3.
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 but very expensive, technologies used for urban water supply and
 transportation. In contrast to the low levels of technological sophisti-
 cation utilized in agricultural projects stands a set of urban projects that
 overlaps both geographically and temporally with those under study.
 One project, the canal of Marseille (1840 to 1848), ajoint urban and rural
 water-supply project, offers a good example of the technologies avail-
 able in the nineteenth century yet not used in agriculture. The canal of
 Marseille featured a large dam and a permanent reservoir, many
 bridges, and it ran underground for 25 percent of its length. The project
 was financed by the city of Marseille, which attempted to sell excess
 water to farmers. The city also wanted farmers to pay a share of the
 building costs equivalent to their share of the water. This led to a price
 for water 15 times the cost of water on other agricultural projects. As a
 result, the scheme to retail excess water to farmers failed.2'
 Despite the available technology the methods used to build irrigation
 canals did not change. Yet it is possible that experience gained from past
 canal construction led to smaller engineering errors. The resulting
 reduction in risk would have increased the viability of projects by
 lowering the risk premiums demanded by investors. Yet technological
 risks-the risks associated with the construction phase of the project-
 seem to have been very limited. Even in the eighteenth century the
 relationship between technology and cost was well established. Engi-
 neering costs could be predicted with a good deal of confidence because
 of the experience gained from transportation canals, which were much
 more complex and thus riskier. Irrigation projects were by contrast very
 simple, even when there were unanticipated delays or higher-than-
 expected costs.22 It thus appears that between 1700 and 1860 change in
 the methods of irrigation canal construction was limited, and techno-
 logical risk did not threaten irrigation projects or constrain the supply of
 irrigation.
 Because the construction of irrigation canals involved considerable
 cash outlays, the assumption that credit was easily available is crucial
 for my argument. While Old Regime France lacked a well-developed,
 centralized credit market, the limited development of credit markets did
 not block the expansion of the irrigated area of Provence.23 In defense
 21 Paul Masson, Encyclopedie des Bouches du Rhone (Paris, 1929-1930), vol. 7, pp. 162-67. This
 canal ran nearly 100 kilometers through a very rugged part of Provence to deliver water to
 Marseille.
 22 The canal of Boisgelin, the most ambitious canal realized prior to the Revolution, shows that
 risk was small. The engineer, Brun, had warned of the very large costs associated with the tunnel.
 Yet he did not doubt that the tunnel could be built. BM Mdjanes, Ms. 840(853). My section titled
 "Institutional Failure: Eminent Domain and Rent-seeking" will discuss how institutional factors
 raised costs on this canal.
 23 Pierre Goubert, L'Ancien Regime (Paris, 1973), vol. 2, chap. 7, offers an introduction to Old
 Regime finance. See also Guy Chaussinant-Nogaret, Les Financiers du Languedoc au XVIIieIe
 siicle (Paris, 1976).
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 of this position one can marshal four different kinds of evidence. First,
 the credit demands of most irrigation canals were tiny relative to the
 credit demands of Provengal villages that borrowed extensively during
 the Old Regime. Second, credit markets based on mortgages, which
 were very active in rural France, could have provided significant
 sources of capital for irrigation promoters, who were often wealthy
 landowners.24 Third, Jewish agents were directly involved in making
 loans to at least one promoter in the 1780s. These loans did not have the
 collateral of land and the promoter paid an interest rate double that of
 the mortgage rate-8 to 10 percent as compared to 5 percent. Fourth,
 the high nobility was also able to finance projects directly in the case of
 many of the smaller projects, perhaps putting its vast wealth at the
 disposal of canal promoters because irrigation canals did not carry the
 stigma attached to many other forms of investment.25 Therefore, it
 seems there were sufficient sources of capital (though not necessarily
 through organized markets) to carry out irrigation projects.
 Finally, the apparent market failure in irrigation cannot be ascribed to a
 lack of acumen on the part of Old Regime investors. In fact the magnitude
 of entrepreneurial activity is striking when it is contrasted with the failures
 endured by canal promoters before 1789. Every canal built after the
 Revolution can be traced back to a serious promoter under the Old Regime
 who had expended considerable resources attempting to secure all the
 authorizations needed to build the canal. These promoters failed over-
 whelmingly, if we measure success by the ability to build a canal and earn
 a profit. The failure rate remains very high even if we demand only that a
 canal be built. Indeed, the pre-Revolutionary expansion of the irrigated
 area represents only 16 percent of what was actually planned before 1789
 and built before 1860. Simple economic arguments do not seem to explain
 the failure of irrigation development under the Old Regime or its success
 after the Revolution. Instead, it seems that the peculiar fragmentation of
 power that characterized the Old Regime constrained Provengal canal
 promoters.
 24 The canal of the Midi was primarily financed by the estates of Languedoc through loans. See
 Robert Forster, The Nobility of Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century: A Social and Economic Study
 (Baltimore, 1960), pp. 66-74; William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century
 France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (New York, 1985), pp. 292-97; and
 Maistre, Le Canal des Deux Mers, chap. 4.
 25 See Paul Masson, "Le Canal de Provence," in Revue historique de Provence (Aix-en-
 Provence, 1901), pp. 423-25; Hubert Elie, "La Speculation sous la Rdgence: l'Affaire du Canal
 d'Avignon a la Mer," Provence Historique, 3 (1953), pp. 112-13; and A. Reboulet, "Construction
 du Canal de Crillon," Mgmoires de l'Acadgmie de Vaucluse, 33 (1914), pp. 46-47. In the case of
 the canal of Crillon, 25 percent of the construction costs was advanced by Jews and another 25
 percent by nobles and bourgeois. Landowners were the largest source of credit in France because
 they could borrow money through mortgages. Had promoters been able to interest more than a
 small number of landowners, the credit problem would never have existed.
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 INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: EMINENT DOMAIN AND RENT-SEEKING
 While the failure of the supply of irrigation had multiple causes, the
 most important, I would argue, lay in the division of authority over
 rights of eminent domain.26 This problem was well understood before
 1789, yet resolution was elusive because eminent domain authority was
 embedded in the Old Regime structure of privileges.
 The woes of a sixteenth-century canal builder illustrate the costs of
 divided authority. In 1554 Adam de Craponne, a Provengal nobleman and
 engineer, received a royal grant to draw water from the Durance. In order
 to secure eminent domain rights for his canal, Craponne had his grant
 acknowledged by the local assembly-the Estates. Yet some Provengal
 communities (called Terres Adjacentes) did not come under the jurisdiction
 of the Estates as far as eminent domain was concerned. These villages
 delayed the project until Craponne gave farmers there unlimited, free
 access to the canal's water.27
 Despite these outlandish concessions Craponne completed his canal
 in 1559 and sold a number of irrigation rights. In dry years, however,
 Terres-Adjacentes villages used up most of the canal's capacity, and
 with no water to deliver, Craponne had to renege on his other contracts.
 The resulting suits led Craponne to an early bankruptcy and discour-
 aged other investors from pursuing irrigation projects. From the stand-
 point of Terres-Adjacentes villages, the whole affair was a free ride.
 Although Craponne's bankruptcy saddled them with part of the main-
 tenance costs, they now received irrigation water without the burden of
 any construction costs. Divided authority over eminent domain could
 indeed create severe problems for canal developers.
 The structure of authority Craponne encountered in the sixteenth
 century was a legacy of medieval state building, and it remained in place
 until the Revolution of 1789. After the division of Provence between the
 Pope and the counts of Provence in the twelfth century, the Pope's
 share became known as the Comtat Venaissin (hereafter the Comtat).
 The Comtat corresponds to the present-day department of the Vau-
 cluse. The counts of Provence retained control of the Comte of
 Provence and the Terres Adjacentes. The western half of the Comte' of
 Provence (hereafter the Comte) and the Terres Adjacentes make up
 26 Other causes of failure were the costs associated with securing water rights and the severe
 revenue problems related to the fact that most of the costs of the network were sunk when the
 builder bargained with landowners to sell them water rights. Although these other causes were
 important, they were due to the same division of authority that encouraged rent-seeking over rights
 of eminent domain. Focusing solely on rights of way simplifies the argument.
 27 On the canal of Craponne see J.-B. Bertin and P. Autier, Adam de Craponne (Paris, 1904);
 Rigaud, Le Canal de Craponne; Jean de Villeneuve, Encyclopedie des Bouches du Rh6ne
 (Marseille, 1825-1829), vol. 3, pp. 698-714; and Masson, Encyclopedie, vol. 7, p. 148.
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 what is now the department of the Bouches du Rhone.28 In 1481 the
 king of France inherited the Comte' and the Terres Adjacentes.
 The geographic divisions outlined above corresponded to organiza-
 tional divisions that seem to have determined the transaction costs of
 irrigation. Prior to the Revolution, two organizations alone should have
 decided the fate of irrigation projects in the Comtat, although, as this
 article will make clear, their authority was far more limited. These
 organizations were the Estates of the Comtat, a representative assem-
 bly in charge of taxation, and the Apostolic Chamber, the Comtat's final
 court of appeals. The approval of the Estates was necessary to secure
 financial or legal support for irrigation projects, but the Pope and his
 local representative (the vice legate) had veto power over decisions by
 the Estates, a veto power they regularly exercised. Similarly, the
 Apostolic Chamber was a court of last resort and should have enforced
 all contracts relating to irrigation. In fact, appeals were possible either
 to the Chamber itself or in some rare cases to papal courts in Rome.29
 The Comte' of Provence had organizations similar to those of the
 Comtat. As a French Pays d'Etat it had, like the Comtat, a fiscal and
 legislative body-the Assemblee du Pays. Like the Estates of the
 Comtat, the Assemblee du Pays could provide a locus of bargaining for
 institutional change. As far as the judicial system in the Comte' was
 concerned, the final court of appeals was the Parlement of Aix.30
 The final area under study, the Terres Adjacentes, was classified as a
 Pays d'Election. These communities were directly under the authority
 of the king and had no Estate. In these villages the division of judicial
 authority among the king, the villages, and the Parlement of Aix was
 very ambiguous. Most importantly for this study, individual villages
 rather than a central authority seem to have controlled eminent domain
 rights. In the Middle Ages the Terres Adjacentes had been autonomous
 and had in fact decided issues of eminent domain alone. Under the Old
 Regime the extent of local autonomy was uncertain and subject to
 erosion by the Crown. Yet the Terres-Adjacentes villages were well
 organized and could credibly threaten to sue anyone who did not secure
 rights of eminent domain from them.
 One might assume that the political border that ran between Comtat
 and Comte was the root cause of the institutional problems, but in fact
 28 The Terres Adjacentes were a set of administratively independent communities that included
 Marseille, Arles, and a number of villages on the border between the Comte and the Comtat. These
 communities had never been directly incorporated into Provence. In fact, until they became part
 of France, the Terres Adjacentes recognized only the direct authority of the Count of Provence.
 The best reference detailing the political divisions of Provence is Edouard Baratier, Histoire de la
 Provence (Toulouse, 1969). For more detail, see Masson, Encyclopedie, vol. 4; and Villeneuve,
 Encyclopedie, vol. 3.
 29 Elie, "La Speculation sous la R6gence," pp. 112-13; and Reboulet, "Construction du Canal
 de Crillon," pp. 37-50.
 30 Masson, Encyclopedie, vol. 7.
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 the two territories were divided by the Durance River. Thus most canals
 were either in the Comtat or in the French part of Provence, even
 though nearly all drew water from the Durance. So most Comtat affairs
 were strictly Comtat affairs and the same was true in the French part of
 Provence. Moreover, the problems of eminent domain were sufficiently
 important within each political division that we can ignore the effect of
 the Comtat's independence from France. Let us, for example, consider
 rights of eminent domain in the Comte. Since any canal on the southern
 side of the river would irrigate land mostly in the Comte, the king, the
 Estates, and the Parlement would all be involved in granting rights of
 way; however, the need to cross the Terres Adjacentes added a further
 cost. In the Comte, the best sites from which to draw water from the
 Durance were in, or led into, the Terres Adjacentes. Thus villages that
 ruled over eminent domain in the Terres Adjacentes could block or delay
 projects.3'
 The hypothesis that divided authority over rights of way made it very
 difficult to build irrigation canals is difficult to test. Nonetheless it is
 possible to examine the history of five Old Regime canals to see whether
 institutions significantly raised the costs of irrigation. One relationship
 emerges from these histories: the more institutional boundaries canals
 crossed, the more difficult they were to build.
 Of the four small canals completed under the Old Regime, three were
 in the Comtat and the fourth in the Comte. Each of the four projects
 distributed water to, at most, a few communities. They did not cross any
 important political boundaries, yet even among the four projects delays
 and transaction costs rose with size.
 The two smallest canals, Janson and Cambis, were each only a few
 kilometers long and faced only minor transaction costs. Each was
 entirely financed by the principal landowner-the Marquis of Janson
 and the Duke of Cambis-who wanted to irrigate his very large estate.
 The marquis and the duke both maintained strong political ties to the
 French royal court, and they successfully lobbied for water grants.
 Their large estates eliminated the free-rider problem and allowed each
 nobleman to internalize most of the benefits of his irrigation canal. In his
 grant application the Marquis of Janson argued that the benefits to his
 estates would more than suffice to cover the construction costs.32 He
 did allow the neighboring community to use the canal for irrigation
 purposes, no doubt to facilitate his use of rights of eminent domain. But
 there is no evidence to show that he or Cambis failed to make a profit
 from the canals, even though the villages did not contribute to construc-
 tion costs. In any case, unlike the other examples, these two small
 3' Bertin and Autier, Adam de Craponne, p. 113.
 32 AN H' 1515 (March 1780).
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 canals were completed swiftly and experienced little in the way of
 transaction costs.
 The third project actually completed was the canal of Cabedan-Neuf,
 built in the Comtat around 1765. Although it affected only three
 communities-Cavaillon, Les Taillades, and Merindol-it was large
 enough to create problems with eminent domain. The canal was built by
 an association of landowners under the tutelage of the city of Cavaillon.
 Because most of the land irrigated by the canal was either in the
 territory of Cavaillon or in that of Les Taillades, costs of the canal were
 apportioned between the two villages according to the area irrigated.
 The third village involved, Merindol, enjoyed a generous free ride.
 Much of the canal passed through Merindol, which, unlike Cavaillon,
 lay in the Comte' not the Comtat and thus was not subject to the powers
 of eminent domain of Comtat authorities. Not surprisingly Merindol
 sued Cavaillon over rights of eminent domain. The issue was settled out
 of court: Merindol received water from the canal, but it did not
 contribute anything to the project.
 Except for the redistributive implications, the free-riding by Merindol
 was relatively unimportant: it did not stop the project. Litigation was
 avoided because Cavaillon alone could have paid for the entire canal
 and still benefited from the project.33 Yet the history of Cabedan-Neuf
 demonstrates that the involvement of a mere three communities was
 enough to drive institutional costs higher than when only one commu-
 nity was involved. These institutional costs were associated with scale
 because of the extreme division of authority in the region.34
 The fourth canal, the canal of Crillon, delivered irrigation water to
 Avignon and surrounding communities. It was built by the Duke of
 Crillon, descendant of an old line of Comtat noblemen who had led the
 French king's armies. Using his favor at court, Crillon secured a grant
 to draw water from the Durance. He then had the grant registered in the
 Parlement of Aix. Next he secured rights of way from the city of
 Avignon that were recognized by the Estates of the Comtat and the vice
 legate. The canal, however, ran through several communities and
 challenged the water monopolies of a number of seigniors and monas-
 teries, all of whom held the project up for ransom by attacking it in
 court. The most important suit was brought by the Duke of Gadagne,
 Lord of Vedene, one of the communities traversed by the canal.
 Gadagne contested Crillon's right both to cross into Vedene and to cross
 3 Syndicat du Canal de Cabedan-Neuf, Archives et Documents 1230-1883 (Cavaillon, 1883), pp.
 48-69. Cavaillon chose to bargain with Merindol directly rather than with the Assemblge for a right
 of eminent domain. Presumably both Merindol and the Assemblge were seeking rents and Merindol
 proved cheaper to pay off.
 34 Across the Durance, in the Comte, the town of Chdteaurenard also attempted to build a canal
 in the 1780s. ChAteaurenard was also forced to negotiate over rights of way and water rights with
 the nearby town of Noves and its seigniors. See Jean-Auguste Barral, Les Irrigations dans les
 Bouches du Rhone (Paris, 1875), vol. 1, pp. 370-71.
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 Gadagne's irrigation canal. The suit was temporarily settled out of court
 in 1777, and in the settlement Gadagne granted rights of way in return
 for water rights. The settlement was not fully executed by either party
 and the case was still being litigated after the French Revolution.35
 The canal of Crillon demonstrates the need for precise geographical
 and historical detail. Gadagne could litigate against Crillon only because
 the canal's rights of eminent domain had been granted first by the city
 of Avignon and only then approved by the Estates. Avignon and the
 Estates had a complex relationship because the city was in fact a Terre
 Adjacente of the Comtat, having been bought by the Pope from the
 counts of Provence in 1348. As a result the authority of the Estates over
 Avignon was unclear. Although the Estates and other Comtat organi-
 zations had approved the canal, they had not specifically granted rights
 of way in the Comtat. Thus the validity of the Duke of Crillon's rights
 of eminent domain was subject to dispute and formed an open avenue
 for anyone to attack the project.
 The history of the canal of Boisgelin, my fifth example, shows the
 costs of fragmented authority in a large-scale project, built in the Comte
 under the financial authority of the Assemblee du Pays after a number
 of other attempts had failed. The proposed canal had two possible
 routes: one ran through the Comte' alone; the other crossed the Terres
 Adjacentes. While the latter would have been cheaper, it involved
 bargaining with the Terres Adjacentes for rights of eminent domain.
 Rather than bargain with each village in the Terres Adjacentes, the
 Assemblee du Pays avoided the issue but paid a very high price.36 The
 Assemblee opted for the all-Comte route-much more expensive from
 an engineering standpoint because it involved tunneling through about
 one kilometer of solid rock near the village of Orgon. The cost of
 tunneling totaled nearly 400,000 livres and absorbed half the yearly
 budget of the canal for eight years.
 Yet piercing the rock of Orgon allowed the promoters to avoid the
 Terres-Adjacentes villages of Senas and Salon, where the cheaper route
 lay. Once the tunnel was built, the Assemblee had the ability to exclude
 the Terres Adjacentes from the benefits of the new canal if they did not
 contribute to its cost. Not surprisingly, the Terres-Adjacentes commu-
 nities did purchase a significant amount of water from the canal just
 before the French Revolution, and a branch canal through Senas and
 Salon was built.
 Unlike all other irrigation projects, which involved little more than
 the digging of ditches, the canal of Boisgelin had to resort to an
 extraordinarily costly technology, a technology imposed by institutional
 " BM Cecano, Ms. 2549. Appeals were heard in the Apostolic Chamber and then in Rome
 throughout the 1780s. Again the settlement gave free water to Gadagne.
 36 See Villeneuve, Encyclopedie, vol. 3, pp. 714-21.
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 constraints. Once again the division of authority led to much higher
 transaction or institutional costs than if only a small canal had been
 built. In this case these institutional costs took the indirect form of
 digging a tunnel at Orgon rather than bargaining or litigation.
 Thus the histories of a few projects make it clear that the institutional
 environment blocked irrigation by raising the cost of canal building. The
 obstacles had their origins in the long-term development of institutions
 in southeastern France. One either had to pay off obstructionist villages,
 as Craponne did, or bear much higher construction costs, as did the
 promoters of the canal through Orgon.37 The presence of organizations
 like the Estates and the Parlement did allow for some institutional
 change. It was, after all, possible to build the canal of Boisgelin. But the
 sort of institutional change that would have substantially reduced costs
 lay outside the authority of these organizations. In fact, not even the
 king, the Parlement, or the Assemblehe could reform the Terres Adja-
 centes. Their peculiar status indeed constituted a privilege, something
 only the Revolution would change.38
 Irrigation was an easy prey for rent-seeking villages because it
 involved both economies of scale and significant geographical speci-
 ficity. Canals were networks; hence the costs involved in building the
 main canals did not rise as quickly as the irrigated area increased.
 Moreover, because canals relied on gravity to move water, each area
 usually had a single most economical drawing site from the river. As a
 result villages close to the Durance could credibly threaten irrigation
 projects with much higher costs or insurmountable engineering prob-
 lems if they refused to grant rights of eminent domain. Most often
 villages were in a position of such strength that promoters could only
 give in or give up.
 The phenomenon of villages holding irrigation projects up for ransom
 was not due to the specific form of village organization in eighteenth-
 century Provence. In fact, as the well-known examples of the sale of
 judicial offices and the monopolies of craft guilds suggest, rent-seeking
 was commonplace under the Old Regime.39 Ironically, in the case of
 irrigation the greatest rent-seeker of them all, the Crown, was generally
 allied with canal promoters against local powers that were holding up
 the projects. Yet the Crown proved powerless to resolve the problem in
 the case of irrigation.
 3 BM Cecano, Ms. 1605 2459, 406198; and Reboulet, "Construction du Canal de Crillon," pp.
 41-44.
 38 The Terres Adjacentes took advantage of Provence for much more than irrigation. See
 Villeneuve, Encyclopedie, vol. 3, pp. 755-61.
 39 See, for example, Roland Mousnier, La Venaliti des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII (Paris,
 1971); and Gail Bossenga, "La Revolution franqaise et les corporations: Trois examples lillois,"
 Annales ESC, 43 (Mar. 1988), pp. 405-26.
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 THE REVOLUTION AND IRRIGATION
 For 25 years after 1789 there was no increase in irrigated area in
 Provence and those networks already in use were very poorly main-
 tained.40 Revolutionary turmoil during the years from 1789 to 1795 was
 violent in Provence. Moreover, starting in 1792, warfare drained away
 manpower and drove up the price of labor relative to land, a problem
 that grew even worse during the Napoleonic period (1798 to 1815). Yet
 even though the Revolution caused delays in the extension of the
 irrigation network, it was bringing about institutional reforms that
 would set the stage for future development, notably the construction of
 a number of new irrigation canals after 1820.
 Institutional reforms, initiated by Revolutionary regimes and contin-
 ued by Napoleon, would drastically cut the institutional costs of
 irrigation in the nineteenth century, consolidating all powers of eminent
 domain in the hands of the central government and destroying the old
 organizations and institutions that had prevented reforms. In Provence
 the annexation of the Comtat and the abolition of the peculiar status of
 the Terres Adjacentes removed two major obstacles to development of
 irrigation. For the first time since the early Middle Ages a single
 authority could decide all issues of property rights in Provence. Beyond
 the simplification of regional boundaries, the most important single
 Revolutionary reform was the centralization of legal and political
 power. Although centralization had been one of the goals of the
 absolutist monarchy, and although the king had held veto power over
 virtually all economic activity, he had never been able to eliminate local
 organizations like the Parlement, the Assemblehe du Pays, the Estates,
 or even village councils. Centralization during the Revolution elimi-
 nated these local organizations and replaced them with a single pyra-
 midic administrative structure headed by the Ministry of Interior. In the
 case of rights of way, the agent of the government at the local level-the
 prefect-was now charged with making all decisions.4' The destruction
 of all other veto players freed irrigation development from the shackles
 of strategic behavior. Towns and villages near rivers could no longer
 refuse rights of way for new irrigation projects simply to protect the
 market value of their older irrigated land or, even worse, to siphon off
 part of the profits.
 Revolutionary reforms gave prefects complete authority over projects
 until they were built and removed the judiciary from the planning stages
 of irrigation, making it difficult for local groups to delay projects through
 litigation. Local groups could appeal a project only before the prefect,
 40 AD Vaucluse S (Usines et Cours d'Eaux, Cavaillon and L'Isle sur Sorgues). The series S was
 being classified and sorted at the time I looked through it, thus no precise references can be given.
 41 Jean Petot, L'Administration des points et chaussees (Paris, 1958), pp. 383-87; Louis
 Bergeron, L'Episode napolgonien: Aspects interieurs (Paris, 1972), p. 33; Sutherland, France
 1789-1815, p. 345; and AD Vaucluse S, Usines et Cours d'Eaux.
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 whose approval was thus sufficient to guarantee the success of an
 irrigation project. Litigation-when it occurred-did not start until after
 the canal was built and the social gains were realized. Moreover,
 conflicts over technical and engineering issues could no longer be
 litigated but were decided by French administrators. After the Revolu-
 tion the central administration not only had the power to provide
 promoters of irrigation with the property rights they needed, it also had
 the power to enforce the contracts.42
 After the end of the Napoleonic regime in 1815, and under many
 different governments, irrigation in southeastern France flourished.
 State help was considerable, including engineering advice, administra-
 tive oversight, and the full power of its newly centralized authority. One
 form of support, however, was conspicuously absent: the government
 offered very few subsidies for the development of irrigation. By and
 large the irrigation canals of the nineteenth century seem to have been
 paid for by the landowners whose fields were irrigated, further evidence
 that institutions rather than technology or profits had caused the earlier
 market failure.
 Whether in the case of a small project such as the canal of Plan-
 Oriental, or in the case of a large project such as the canal of Carpentras,
 state approval was decisive. The Plan-Oriental canal involved only a
 small amount of land (800 hectares) and delivered water to fields only in
 a few villages. The project was quickly approved by the prefect and
 completed in 1823, less than four years after initiation. In contrast, the
 canal of Carpentras involved more than 4,000 hectares in many different
 communities. Although the size of the canal slowed development, the
 state showed the flexibility of its new power by designing organizations
 with authority over many communities and many canals. For example,
 an organization was created that legally grouped all the canals drawing
 water from the Durance at the site originally used by Cabedan-Neuf
 alone, thereby allowing an efficient sharing of this desirable site.43
 Because the promoters were able to rely on the support and authority of
 the national government the Carpentras canal was completed in 1865,
 less than 20 years from its launching.
 The overall success of irrigation in the nineteenth century is striking:
 more than 16,000 hectares, at least half of all the land irrigated from the
 Durance by 1875, received water from canals completed between 1820
 and 1860. In all, more than 80 percent of the increase in irrigated area
 between 1700 and 1860 came after 1820.
 42 Fernand Ponteil, Les Institutions de la France de 1814 a 1870 (Paris, 1965), pp. 30-34.
 43 Rend Caillet, Le Canal de Carpentras, pp. 75-76.
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 CONCLUSION
 Under the Old Regime the division of authority over rights of eminent
 domain limited the scale of irrigation development. In Provence the
 political division of authority-a legacy of the Middle Ages-gave
 ample opportunities to a variety of groups to hold up projects. Villages
 successfully used this position to extract rents from canal promoters.44
 Only local irrigation projects could avoid the costs associated with
 divided authority over rights of eminent domain. As a result, the
 transaction costs associated with irrigation development increased
 dramatically when projects crossed authority boundaries. Irrigation
 promoters were forced to face these transaction costs because the state
 proved incapable of reform.
 The problems of eminent domain were simply not resolved before the
 French Revolution, which makes it surprising that any irrigation
 projects were developed before 1789. By contrast, the nineteenth
 century witnessed substantial growth in irrigation in southeastern
 France without significant litigation and with much shorter delays than
 had been customary in the previous century. Between 1820 and 1865 the
 area irrigated in Provence more than doubled and all the water in the
 Durance was used. Hence, insofar as irrigation is concerned the
 Revolution seems to have been a turning point. While the contribution
 of the Revolution to economic growth still eludes us, it appears that 1789
 had a dramatic effect on transaction costs in irrigation.
 Appendix
 INCREASES IN IRRIGATED AREA
 The studies of irrigation by J.-A. Barral offer good data to estimate the increase in
 total output as a result of irrigation because he investigated irrigated acreage thoroughly
 for each canal. In 1875 the total irrigated area for the region was about 52,700 hectares,
 or 18 percent of the total cultivated area.45 To evaluate total output changes we must
 know the increase in area irrigated, not only from the Durance (a figure that is available
 and presented in Table 3), but also from other rivers. The increase in irrigation from
 other sources is not known precisely, so I present two estimates. The first concerns the
 impact of the increase in Durance irrigation, while the second estimates the increase in
 output that would have occurred if irrigation from all sources had grown at the same rate
 44Veto power was widely used to extract rents from developers in Old Regime Provence; see
 Baehrel, La Basse Provence rurale, pp. 450-56; Rend Pillorget, Les Mouvements insurrectionnels
 de Provence entre 1596 et 1715 (Paris, 1975), pp. 196-207; Maurice Agulhon, La Vie sociale en
 Provence inUerieure au lendemain de la Revolution (Paris, 1970), pp. 43-59.
 45 One hundred forty thousand acres. The total cultivated area in the Bouches du Rh6ne and the
 Vaucluse was 201,000 hectares (excluding olive groves and vines). Since I was concerned with
 output that could be increased by irrigation, I excluded both olives and vines from my measure of
 total cultivated area. J.-A. Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse (Paris, 1876), pp. 323-34; idem,
 Les Irrigations dans les Bouches du Rh6ne, pp. 83-87, 511-12.
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 TABLE 3
 INCREASES IN AREA IRRIGATED FROM THE DURANCE
 (in hectares)
 Periods
 Region 1100-1700 1700-1789 1790-1820 1820-1860
 Vaucluse 3,835 2,253 0 9,105
 Bouches du Rh6ne 10,624 1,765 0 8,211
 Total 14,459 4,108 0 16,316
 Sources: See Appendix text; Jean-Auguste Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse (Paris, 1876),
 pp. 323-34; and Jean-Auguste Barral, Les Irrigations dans les Bouches du Rh6ne (Paris, 1875), vol.
 1, pp. 86-91, 511-12.
 as Durance irrigation. Since irrigation at least doubled output we know that the increase
 in output will be close to the ratio of newly irrigated area to total cultivated area. The
 early nineteenth-century canals added 16,314 hectares of irrigated land from the
 Durance compared with 3,211 for the eighteenth century as a whole. The Durance's
 increase alone would have led to a 7.7 percent increase in total output for Provence. If
 non-Durance irrigation witnessed the same growth, total output would have increased
 by about 12 percent.
 LAND PRICES
 Sampling and Sorting
 At least four notarial etudes (practices) were active in Cavaillon between 1700 and
 1855. However, gathering data from all land contracts for Cavaillon from 1700 to 1855
 would have taken at least two years' research. Sampling was therefore necessary. The
 data represent a complete, quinquennial sample of both land-sale and land-rental
 contracts from one etude from 1700 to 1855. Up to 1720 I sampled two etudes because
 the first had too few land contracts. The total sample contains 1,781 observations. To
 obtain both an irrigated- and a dry-land price series, it was necessary to distinguish sales
 and rental of irrigated land. Before 1800 such sorting was relatively easy since the
 contracts all contained detailed information about the quality of the land. After 1800,
 however, notaries ceased recording such information regularly. I therefore relied on
 location data to distinguish between irrigated and dry land after 1800. Such sorting by
 location is imperfect, making the irrigated series a downward-biased estimate of
 irrigated land prices and the dry series an upward-biased estimate of the price of dry
 land after 1800.
 Constructing the Series
 The land prices were estimated with a simple procedure that allowed me to use data
 both from rental contracts that predominated before 1789 and from sales contracts that
 predominated after the Revolution. For rental contracts the value of a transaction was
 computed by capitalizing the rent using the interest rate. Such a procedure ignores
 capital gains; thus the price series for dry and irrigated land will be downward-biased.
 If anything this will reduce the absolute value of the difference in these prices, which
 will bring down the estimated rates of return. For sales, the value of land was simply the
 price. For each year for each type of land (dry or irrigated), average prices were
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 TABLE 4
 PRICE SERIES FOR PROVENCE, 1700-1855
 Daily Wages Land Prices
 (unfed, in francs) (in francs per hectare)
 Date Unskilled Skilled Dry Irrigated
 1700 0.61 1.00 511 2,153
 1705 0.77 0.90 814 2,730
 1710 0.76 1.07 1,080 2,201
 1715 0.74 1.00 851 2,819
 1720 0.75 1.00 1,510 2,590
 1725 0.74 1.12 939 2,297
 1730 0.79 1.11 1,031 2,202
 1735 0.76 1.22 1,598 2,407
 1740 0.73 1.10 1,320 2,355
 1745 0.92 1.25 1,538 2,477
 1750 0.88 1.14 1,827 2,694
 1755 0.94 1.25 1,827 2,694
 1760 0.76 1.30 1,934 2,857
 1765 0.93 1.25 1,410 2,867
 1770 1.09 1.25 2,361 3,854
 1775 1.12 1.60 2,081 3,055
 1780 1.12 1.50 2,203 5,003
 1785 1.18 1.50 1,604 4,328
 1790 1.14 1.50 2,756 3,271
 1795 4,365 6,309
 1800 1.66 2.41 1,910 2,963
 1805 1.15 2.24 2,044 5,438
 1810 1.59 2.16 2,698 4,097
 1815 1.61 2.43 2,640 3,831
 1820 1.78 2.27 2,420 3,677
 1825 1.74 2.22 2,985 5,100
 1830 1.73 3.18 2,590 4,411
 1835 1.89 3.00 2,450 4,469
 1840 1.78 2.60 2,399 5,149
 1845 1.77 3.00 2,621 5,192
 1850 1.88 3.00 2,679 5,400
 1855 1.86 3.00 2,900 5,470
 Sources: See text, fn. 13, and the Appendix text.
 calculated for each type of contract as the sum of the value of all transactions divided
 by the total area sold.
 WAGES
 The sample contains 851 bills of wages for 13 professions, covering roughly 150 years
 for a total of over 60,000 man-days. The bills were sorted into skilled and unskilled and
 the reported wages are the ratio of the total wage bill for a given year divided by the total
 number of days worked. To the extent that canals were built solely in the winter-when
 wages were lower than average-the rates of return would be even higher than
 estimated. Yet since winter and summer wages seem to move in tandem, the trends in
 the wage bills should not depend on the aggregation procedure. Since we care most
 about the trend in benefit-cost ratios, the procedure used here seems adequate. Table 4
 presents both wage and land prices.
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 TABLE 5
 HYPOTHETICAL BENEFIT-COST RATIOS FOR IRRIGATION PROJECTS
 Date Cabedan-Neuf I Cabedan-Neuf II Crillon Plan-Oriental Carpentras
 1700 3.85 3.20 3.66 3.82 3.13
 1705 4.01 3.45 3.91 4.34 3.33
 1710 2.06 1.83 2.06 2.27 1.75
 1715 3.96 3.42 3.88 4.24 3.30
 1720 1.91 1.80 1.99 2.29 1.71
 1725 2.57 2.24 2.53 2.74 2.17
 1730 2.14 1.88 2.12 2.32 1.82
 1735 1.29 1.20 1.34 1.49 1.14
 1740 1.82 1.67 1.87 2.07 1.59
 1745 1.08 0.92 1.04 1.23 0.88
 1750 1.30 1.23 1.36 1.58 1.16
 1755 1.22 1.14 1.27 1.45 1.07
 1760 1.33 1.28 1.42 1.60 1.20
 1765 2.24 2.02 2.26 2.53 1.93
 1770 1.96 1.92 2.11 2.48 1.78
 1775 1.15 1.06 1.18 1.33 1.01
 1780 3.31 3.10 3.44 3.93 2.92
 1785 3.43 3.04 3.42 3.82 2.92
 1790 0.56 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.51
 1795
 1800 0.87 0.75 0.85 0.92 0.70
 1805 3.02 2.65 3.00 3.27 2.49
 1810 1.19 1.09 1.22 1.37 1.02
 1815 0.95 0.85 0.96 1.06 0.80
 1820 1.03 0.91 1.03 1.14 0.86
 1825 1.71 1.57 1.75 1.99 1.49
 1830 1.29 1.14 1.28 1.37 1.10
 1835 1.46 1.27 1.44 1.55 1.24
 1840 2.18 1.92 2.16 2.36 1.86
 1845 1.88 1.67 1.87 2.02 1.62
 1850 1.92 1.69 1.91 2.07 1.63
 1855 1.81 1.62 1.82 1.98 1.57
 Sources: Tables 1 and 2.
 CANAL CONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS
 Number of Man-Days
 Canal construction accounts rarely itemized costs beyond excavation (terrassement)
 and skilled construction (ouvrages d'arts). As the former was done by unskilled labor,
 I divided those costs by the wage for unskilled labor for the period in which the project
 was carried out to get an an estimate of the quantity of labor employed. To simplify the
 calculation of the rates of return, I assigned all skilled construction and administrative
 costs to skilled labor. Skilled construction involved the building of bridges for roads
 over canals and aqueducts for canals over small rivers and valleys. Such jobs were
 clearly the domain of skilled masons. Nonlabor inputs were also assigned to skilled
 labor, because the primary input of canals other than labor was quarried stone.
 Quarrying was an extractive industry that required only skilled labor and some
 transportation. Thus the cost of quarried stone should closely follow the price of skilled
 labor. The sum of nonlabor inputs, skilled labor, and administrative expenses was
 divided by the skilled wage to get an estimate for the number of skilled man-days.
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 TABLE 6
 HYPOTHETICAL INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN FOR IRRIGATION PROJECTS
 Interest
 Date Cabedan-NeufI Cabedan-Neuf II Crillon Plan-Oriental Carpentras Rate
 1700 157.5% 84.6% 120.4% 156.1% 50.1% 5.36%
 1705 166.0 102.4 127.2 185.0 54.1 5.15
 1710 77.9 35.4 68.8 94.3 30.1 5.30
 1715 157.3 93.2 121.0 173.0 51.5 5.30
 1720 61.3 27.9 58.2 86.5 25.8 4.62
 1725 95.5 45.0 80.5 105.0 34.8 4.62
 1730 77.3 32.4 67.6 89.4 29.2 4.94
 1735 25.3 -3.7 27.6 41.3 10.2 4.94
 1740 55.6 19.0 52.3 71.3 22.7 4.90
 1745 35.5 3.1 35.8 50.9 14.4 4.90
 1750 26.7 -0.8 29.6 47.5 11.3 5.51
 1755 21.4 -6.7 24.1 38.8 8.3 5.51
 1760 32.6 6.0 35.7 57.5 14.7 5.04
 1765 88.5 47.1 77.6 111.0 34.4 5.04
 1770 64.0 35.9 62.1 98.4 28.7 5.03
 1775 17.1 -11.1 19.6 32.6 5.8 5.03
 1780 127.1 85.3 106.7 164.2 48.0 5.01
 1785 138.5 84.7 111.2 161.0 48.5 5.01
 1790 -36.3 -53.4 -44.2 -24.0 31.2 6.87
 1795
 1800 -6.9 -36.5 -12.1 -0.9 10.8 9.30
 1805 93.5 39.8 77.8 98.6 32.8 8.70
 1810 12.7 -17.4 13.4 23.1 2.4 6.15
 1815 -7.8 -10.6 -10.2 15.3 -8.3 7.40
 1820 17.6 -12.5 18.9 29.9 5.3 6.70
 1825 58.4 24.8 55.7 81.5 24.6 5.09
 1830 49.7 15.2 47.9 67.8 20.4 5.16
 1835 58.9 21.1 54.6 75.4 23.5 4.33
 1840 89.3 44.7 77.3 107.4 33.9 4.58
 1845 59.2 17.7 53.6 67.4 22.9 3.62
 1850 66.6 24.2 59.6 77.1 25.7 3.57
 1855 61.4 21.9 56.1 76.2 24.1 4.41
 Sources: Tables 1 and 2.
 Land Consumed by Canals
 The main canal of Carpentras, the largest canal in my sample, was only 7.5 meters
 wide. Including the embankments, it occupied an area less than 17 meters across for the
 first quarter of its length. The rest of the main canal occupied an area less than 10 meters
 wide, and its branches were even smaller. Other canals were less than 4 meters at their
 widest and their branches were much smaller than that. I assumed that all canals
 required a band of land 15 meters wide and the length of the canal and its main branches.
 This simplifying assumption, by reducing the estimated profits, can only strengthen any
 finding that irrigation was profitable before 1760.46
 46 Caillet, Canal de Carpentras, pp. 194-212.
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 Uncounted Revenues
 I disregarded certain revenues accruing to canals that are difficult to estimate. These
 revenues came from the sale of water-power rights on the canal to mill owners. To be
 sure, mills were an important source of revenues for some canals. They brought in
 revenues. equal to one-sixth of maintenance costs on the canal of Crillon. A mill was
 worth above 20,000 livres in the eighteenth century or more than 5 percent of the cost
 of a small canal.47 The size and value of mills varied greatly. Moreover, the value of a
 mill is not a good indicator for the rent of the fall, which is what accrues to the canal
 owner. Therefore one would need not only the rental contracts of the mill but also their
 agreement with the canal to know what they paid for the fall. The archival research
 effort to secure rental contracts would thus be very large for little gain. Obviously the
 omission will push my hypothetical rates of return downward.
 Maintenance Costs
 Some maintenance costs already appear in the price of irrigated land. Indeed the price
 of a particular piece of irrigated land is equal to the discounted stream of profits from
 using that land minus the capitalized value of whatever maintenance costs are assessed
 on that land. If all irrigated land were assessed uniformly there would be no need to
 count maintenance costs, but such uniformity was far from prevalent in Cavaillon,
 where each canal had a different organization dealing with maintenance. Each organi-
 zation assessed landowners on a yearly basis for contributions, but it did not assess land
 uniformly, either over time or across parcels. Thus the land price series reflect only
 maintenance costs as assessed by the institutions governing canals in Cavaillon. It is
 clearly wrong to assume that the maintenance costs already affecting the irrigated price
 series are the correct ones for all projects. As a result it seemed best to assume that the
 price series reflect the discounted future revenues from land and to account for
 maintenance costs explicitly. To do this, and to simplify the calculation of internal rates
 of return, I assumed that the promoters created a sinking fund to pay for the future
 maintenance costs.
 4 AD Vaucluse, I doc. 221. See also AD Vaucluse, S, Usines et Cours d'Eaux (Avignon, canal
 de Crillon, 1820).
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